Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched his third Cabinet in late December 2014.

Subsequently, it has spelled out a basic policy to revitalize Japan’s economy as formulated by the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization (1). In it, the government pledged that Japan will create new markets and new business opportunities by reforming the so-called bedrock regulations in areas such as agriculture, employment, healthcare, and energy.”

Bedrock regulations refer to firmly entrenched regulations that parties with vested interests—typically government organs, administrative institutions, or industrial groups—oppose reform, which makes the loosening or dismantling of regulations far from easy. Since the 1980s, the government has pursued deregulation in many areas with an eye to facilitating economic growth. However, bedrock regulations are the areas that have faced strong resistance from parties with vested interests, and, consequently, they have been put off for years and years—that is until now.

There are several laws that are subject to this debate, laws such as the Road Transportation Act, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, the Medical Practitioners Act, the Food Sanitation Act, the Agricultural Land Act, the Health Insurance Act, the Social Welfare Act, the Radio Act, and the Worker Dispatch Law. However, there exist other “bedrock barriers” to growth that are non-legal and unrelated to existing systems and arrangements.

This article uses the bedrock regulation removal debate to search for and expose potential innovation opportunities.


On Labor Market Reform
Efforts to remove so-called bedrock regulations in Japan continue.

Following the announcement of a plan to implement reform at the intersection of the fields of agriculture and finance via regulatory changes to affect the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, widely known as JA-Zenchu (which overseas a body of agricultural cooperative organizations nationwide known as JA) (2), the media reported that labor system reforms that will cut across all industries are also in the pipeline (3).

The global market has entered an era of hyper competition in productivity. In conjunction with this, companies will pursue the automation of business processes using digital technology as well as a shift to self-service. As such, existing labor regulations will no longer apply and will be rendered outdated. Consequently, the focus of labor regulations will be required to shift to work that requires human intelligence or that is otherwise not amenable to digitization.

Celent has long advocated deregulation and technological progress/innovation as an opportunity to innovate and driver of innovation. The proliferation of digital technologies boosts the possibilities of technological innovation and, at the same time, deregulation offers an opportunity for innovative technologies to be applied.

In addition, and on a different note, Celent hopes to see the creation of new employee incentive plans as a way to accelerate growth strategies. Western stock-based incentive systems epitomized by stock options have come with an array of obstacles . If a new, Japanese compensation sharing plan that links corporate results with individual compensation can be created, then it is likely that highly motivated entrepreneurs well versed in digital technology, coupled with the backing of a nationally driven initiative to back a growth strategy, will be able to accelerate innovation.




政府の掲げる「岩盤」規制(bedrock regulations)改革に反して、法律や制度以外にも、成長戦略の妨げとなる「岩盤」が存在する。






  • 組み合せ
    2015年1月に発表された、大垣信用金庫と西濃信用金庫の合併は、「5年後、10年後の経営戦略を考えた。人口減少、市場縮小を見据えた前向きな合併」との両金庫発表(1) 通り、合併後の規模は預金量で7千億円と中堅並みだが、高い自己資本比率に注目すべきである。大垣が12%台、西濃は15%台という優良な信金同士の組み合せは、単独でも生き残れる信金が、より戦略的に動き、地域シェアの維持向上と、一層の規模の経済を狙ったものと解せる。岐阜県は、十六銀行(資金量5兆円)、大垣共立銀行(4.2兆円)、岐阜信用金庫(2.1兆円)と優れた地域金融機関が多く、全国有数のリテール金融激戦地。業界の将来動向を写す合併とみなされ得る。
  • アウトルック
    適切な規模と健全な経営内容を持つ信金同士が戦略的な提携・合併を経て、適切な数の組織が生き残るとの見方が支配的であろう。米国のクレジットユニオン業界(2) 同様に、存続のためのバーは更に高まり、既に都市部を中心に、2兆円規模を超える大手信金が多数誕生している。今後は、規模と健全性、効率性に加え、信金ならではのニッチなサービスを提供し、ローカルなニーズを満たす戦略が不可欠と想定される。
  • 課題と戦略

路面店舗や職員の渉外活動、地域社会に強い信用金庫と、ネットや通信販売、全国規模のマスマーケティングに強いネット専業(銀行、保険、証券)が組み戦略的なO2O(Online to Offline)チャネル展開やオムニチャネル(Omnichannel)マーケティングを実現すれば、メガバンク、メガ保険との立ち位置の違いからユニークなサービスが展望され、少子高齢化、地方経済の衰退が叫ばれる中で、新たな金融デリバリーモデルが展望されよう。その際のKFSは、テクノロジーの活用と新たなリソース、特にマーケティングノウハウとなるはずだ。


(1) 合併趣意書 (大垣信金、西濃信金)


(2) 米国のクレジットユニオン業界からの示唆は、下記セレントレポートなどに詳しい。




2014年12月に発足した第3次安倍政府は、「日本経済再生本部」において日本経済の再生に向けた基本方針を発表した。 そこでは、「農業、雇用、医療、エネルギー等のいわゆる岩盤規制(bedrock regulations)に対して、一歩たりとも後退することなく改革を進め、新たな市場とビジネスチャンスを生み出していく。」と明言している。






東京証券取引所は昨年11月、検討していた現物株の取引時間の拡大を見送ると発表 した(1)。夜間取引を中心に可能性を探ってきたものの大半の証券会社から同意を得られなかったと発表。東証はこのまま取引時間を拡大しても多様な参加者が見込めないとの認識を示すが、東京市場の国際競争力の低下が大いに懸念される。





(1) 取引時間の拡大に関する検討結果について (東証)
(2) 平野会長記者会見 (全銀協)
(3) 銀行振込24時間化、宣言とは程遠い実情 (日経)

Digital technology is spurring straight through processing (STP) in Financial Services Industry

For the first English blog post of 2015, I would like to begin with a subtle but evident trend that could have major implications for the financial industry in the future.

The media has been abuzz with reports of Toppan Printing’s plan to introduce an electronic system to facilitate the sale of home loans. In light of this, in this edition we want to consider straight through processing and its possibilities and implications in the financial services industry.

The proliferation of bank ATMs has largely driven cash transactions from banks, bank branches, and cashier windows. Meanwhile, as banking services have migrated online, online banking and online trading have resulted in small-value, high-frequency financial transactions becoming increasingly self-service in nature.

Similarly, the Internet has and continues to transform the insurance industry. Online insurance premiums payment and online requests for insurance materials have already become the norm. However, documentation and message formats particular to an industry or specific to individual financial institutions are a challenge. Today the technology is still a far cry from being able to automate business processes for complex products. As such, this inability—in addition to administrative costs and financial transaction risk—has also become a major obstacle to sales channel diversification.

Bank home loans could be called the poster child for products that have fallen behind the digitization and STP curve. However, if digital technology could be used to handle financial products—in this case home loans—that need to be processed manually, then it would be possible to recommend and compare products so that consumers can obtain the optimal loan product at the right time and place. Banks are the companies that create financial products—home loans; homebuilders and house manufacturers are the companies that market or sell these products. Digital technology is driving the decoupling of product creation from product sale, and profoundly transforming this business model.

A glimmer of this and things to come appeared on in the December 22 edition of Nikkei (1). This glimmer was an article reporting on a new initiative by Toppan Printing, in conjunction with realtor Tokyu Livable and four banks—the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Sony Bank, and Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation.

Today the proliferation of digital technology is spurring the automation of business processes. Digitization is a key technological development that promises to bring improvements and advancements in many areas. Indeed, processes that cannot be digitized are likely either extremely high value-added or, perhaps, should be eliminated.


(1) The Toppan-developed system will be set up at Tokyu Livable’s network of real estate offices. It is designed to streamline the home loan application process by allowing customers to use a tablet computer to apply for a mortgage from any of the four banks, and to as many as three at once.

December 22 edition of Nikkei


Tokyu Livable


2014年12月に発足した第3次安倍政府は、「日本経済再生本部」において日本経済の再生に向けた基本方針を発表 した(1)。 そこでは、「農業、雇用、医療、エネルギー等のいわゆる岩盤規制(bedrock regulations)に対して、一歩たりとも後退することなく改革を進め、新たな市場とビジネスチャンスを生み出していく。」と明言している。







先の農業分野、系統金融分野における、全国農業協同組合中央会(JA全中)の改革(2) に続き、全産業に関わる、雇用市場の制度改革案(3) が報道された。





(1) アベノミクス成長戦略の実行・実現について (日本経済再生本部)

(2) JA全中を「解体」 政府、改革期間3年に短縮 (日経)

(3) 年収1075万円以上の専門職対象 労働時間規制外す (日経)









証券サービスにおいては、FIXプロトコルとSTP ( Straight Through Processing ) の推進は機関投資家や個人投資家に、新たな収益機会をもたらすのみならず、電子取引、アルゴリズム取引、HFT、SORなど、業界地図を塗り替えるトレンドの誘因となった。機関投資家におけるHFT(高頻度取引)や電子取引比率の高揚、個人投資家にデイトレーダーやオンライン証券の隆盛は、業界構造に破壊的な変化をもたらした。

保険サービスはどうか。顧客の保険リテラシーの向上は、「勧められる」から「比較する」時代への変化を加速する。主体的な保険取引の行動様式に合致した販売チャネルを構想する時、銀行サービス、証券サービス、ひいては、小売市場全般におけるオムニチャネルの動向は看過できない。特に、O2O (Online to Offline)コミュニケーションや‘People like you’ 機能(例:これを買った人はこれも買っています)など、デジタルネイティブチャネルのマーケティング手法が、保険販売チャネルの常識となる日も遠くないだろう。



一方で、業界や個別金融機関に固有な文書やメッセージ形式が災いし、複雑な商品の事務手続きは、業務プロセスの自動化(STP:Straight Through Processing)にほど遠い。このことは、事務コストや金融取引リスクのみならず、販売チャネルの多様化においても、大きな障壁となる。


今日、デジタル技術の普及は、この潮流をドライブし、デジタル化は全てを改善するキーテクノロジーとなろう。逆に、デジタル化出来ないプロセスは、極めて付加価値の高いプロセスか、削除すべき工程かもしれない。バックオフィスのBPO(Business Process Outsourcing)やシェアードサービスも有効な手段となる。ここでも、多様化は規模の経済、範囲の経済を通じて、新たな事業機会を産み、また、事務処理の改善のみならず、顧客接点の改善においても、セルフサービスと事務処理完結は、不可欠な対応と言える。もはや、デジタル化され自己完結していないプロセスは、顧客からも、販売チャネルからも選択されない。


2014/12/22(月曜日)に報道 された、凸版印刷 、東急リバブル、三菱東京UFJ銀行、三井住友信託銀行、ソニー銀行、三菱UFJ信託銀行の4行の取り組みに、その萌芽を見ることが出来る。






Decoupling of Product creation from Sales: Modularization in the Financial Services Industry

There is no need to quote Darwin on evolutionary theory: only those that adapt will survive. Responsiveness to change — not the ability to avoid it — should foster an ability to leverage change. In this post, as a strategic implication for financial institutions and technology vendors, we discuss the modularization in the financial services industry.

For some time, Celent has advocated that players in the financial services industry seek the full use and application of technology such as modularization, decoupling, and packages, and use these deftly in business functions, business processes, loosely coupled IT systems, standardization of procedures and interfaces, and international division of labor via horizontal deployment. In terms of financial instruments, investment trusts and life insurance products are the areas in which the decoupling of product creation and sales has advanced the most. These are also two major products sold via the banking channel.


The case of investment trusts
In the case of investment trusts, the process comprises two parts: the selection of the investment target (portfolio establishment) and the sales of the investment trust. The first of these involves the design or building (creation) of the product (portfolio); the latter refers to the sales of the investment trust security (shares and investment trust beneficiary certificates). Sellers of the product handle related paperwork, such as generating and processing customer transaction reports.

Until the 1960s, during the closed model era of securities firms and asset management firms, the norm was for asset management companies to entrust sales to external securities firms (full service brokers). A closed relationship with an established fixed commission structure (investment trust commission fee [paid by the customer to the securities firm] and a securities transaction fee [paid from the asset management firm to the securities firm]) existed for a prolonged period of time under which asset management companies and brokers entrusted transactions to each other to their mutual benefit. Subsequently, advances in the diversification in sales models were made.

In the 1970s, direct sales no-load funds emerged. There were a number of factors underpinning this: the liberalization of securities trading commissions, sluggish demand in the securities market, and the emergence of no-frills discount brokers that offered investors no advice. However, this entailed only a diversification of sales; no advancement in diversification of product design, creation, and sales emerged as a closed-model system remained in place.

Ultimately, innovation occurred in the form of what was tantamount to an investment trust supermarket. In 1992, the broker Charles Schwab launched its Schwab One source (product). Under this customers could purchase from a list of several investment trusts without paying any fees; the flip side was that Schwab collected an annual management fee based on the asset balance entrusted by investment trust firms. This was a system under which the investment trusts were put on display — like items on shelves in a supermarket — to be selected by customers, and “stores” paid a commission solely on items sold — , that is to say, the amount transacted. This opened up the interface between asset management companies and securities firms, spurring the modularization — or separation — of product creation and product sales.


The case of life insurance products
The case of Japan’s life insurers differs slightly. For a protracted period of time, the wellspring of their competitiveness was their own sales capacity, which might make the transformation seen in the investment trust business model described above a bit of a rough fit. However, against the background of decoupling of product creation from sales seen in the West, there have been cases of global firms with a long history in Japan genuinely transitioning assembler-type models (business model seen in manufacturing industry which builds up a module that parts makers offer on the premise of open architecture and provides completed products). These companies accomplish this through the integration of the operations of subsidiaries by sector (life, nonlife), finding a balance between indirect agent sales and direct online sales, and sharing back office functions (shared service). In tandem with this, there should also be an increase in insurers that are proactively seeking to supply components (financial products dedicated for these assemblers).

  • Bank Sales Channels
    Insurers will continue to have high expectations for bank sales channels. Insurer premium growth is largely dependent upon growth in the sale of savings-related products such as payment in lump sum whole life insurance. This is particularly important when it comes to the life insurance business.
    At the same time, viewed from the perspective of banks, off-balance sheet bank sales of insurance products by cross-selling is attractive as a new fee-generating business.
    For insurers, the bank sales channel can be regarded as a new business under which insurers develop partnerships with banks on a nearly equal footing. Insurance carriers develop the insurance products and operate the company while agents or producers (firms selling insurance) sell the products. Moving ahead, new partnerships are expected to arise based upon the increasing diversity of sales channels.
  • Brick-and-mortar shops
    Brick-and-mortar shops are increasing rapidly as a new business format for insurance agents.
    In particular, growth has been very visible in recent years as the number of such shops surged from around 200 in 2009 to approach 1,000 shops in 2013 for a compound annual growth rate of over 30%. With these shops frequently located in large facilities with high volumes of customer traffic and in busy roadside areas, the operators of these shops are competing for customers with other retailers and financial institutions such as banks.
    Insurance aggregators conduct contracts for multiple insurers, embodying an approach that strays from the conventional approach of working from selling a set menu of products; instead, they stress “life plans” and focus on demand from customers switching from other plans, offering one-stop shopping for both life insurance and nonlife insurance. In short, these companies have changed sales from the conventional process of offering what is akin to off-the-shelf insurance products, shifting to a neutral, consulting-based sales approach that proposes the optimal “coverage” services or offerings from various insurers.
    Currently, three types of insurance aggregators— shops that conclude sales contracts for insurers and handle the products of multiple insurers— exist in Japan. Today insurance aggregators account for approximately 5% of insurance sales, but Celent sees the share held by the insurance aggregator segment— (including bank channels and an array of sales channels— ) increasing and forecasts growth to the tune of 30% CAGR over the next three years.


In the insurance industry of Japan, for the trends and initiatives of modularization of the financial services industry, we recommend the Celent report below.



セレントはかねてより、金融サービス業における、製販分離とモジュール化の有効性を主張してきた。製販分離とは、すなわち、金融商品の製造と販売の分離を指し、そこでは、「モジュール化」「アンバンドリング」「パッケージャ」などの技術経営の適用と、それらの手法を駆使した、業務機能、業務プロセス、IT システムの疎結合化、インターフェースと手順の標準化、その水平展開による国際分業などの有効性などが提唱される。金融商品において、生命保険と投資信託の2つは、最も製販分離が進んだ商品である。そして、これらは銀行チャネルで販売される2大商品である。



証券会社と投信会社のクローズド・モデルの時代、1960 年代までは、投信会社から外部の証券会社(フルサービス・ブローカー)への委託販売が主流であった。固定的な手数料体系(投信販売手数料(顧客から証券会社へ支払われる)と株式売買手数料(投信会社会社から証券会社へ支払われる))と、投信会社と証券会社の間の互恵的な委託販売関係から、長らくクローズドな関係が構築されてきた。その後、販売形態の多様化が進展した。

1970 年代以降、ノーロード・ファンド(販売手数料ゼロ)の直接販売事業者が出現した。その背景には、①株式売買手数料自由化、②株式市場の需要不振、③アドバイス無しのディスカウントブローカの台頭があるが、この時代は、販売の多様化のみで、設計、製造、販売を兼業するクローズド・モデルに変化は無かった。

最後に、投信スーパーマーケットによる革新が起きた。チャールズ・シュワブが1992 年に販売を開始したシュワブ・ワンソースでは、リストアップされた複数の投信を購入する限り、顧客には全く手数料がかからず、代わりに、シュワブは投信会社から、預かり資産残高に応じた年間の管理手数料を徴収した。投信をスーパー店頭の棚に載せ、売れた分だけの手数料を取る方式であった。投信会社と証券会社のインターフェースがオープン化され、製造と販売がモジュラー化し、分離した。



  • 銀行窓販
  • 保険ショップ



  • 日本の保険業界の動向パート2:新時代の販売チャネルにおける課題と対処策
  • 日本における乗合保険代理店:勧められるから比較する時代へ


Abenomics: The Fourth Arrow of Innovation and Globalization


The Bank of Japan surprised markets with further monetary easing on October 31, 2014. Befitting Halloween, the BOJ had market watchers on the edge of their seats when the policy committee meeting dragged past noon, finally concluding at 1:44 p.m. Three minutes later, the results sent the Nikkei Average soaring 400 yen. The buying continued with the Nikkei closing up 755 yen at a seven-year high of 16,413. This Halloween treat rippled overseas to major bourses in Asia. Later that evening, the Dow Jones Industrial average followed suit, riding the announcement to a new high. Meanwhile, in the forex market, the yen hit a near seven-year low of more than 112 yen to the dollar. In short, this news focused the attention of market players on Japan’s market and Abenomics.



With the reshuffling of his Cabinet on September 3, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the second stage of his administration. This offered a chance to appraise his core economic policy of Abenomics.

It was only a year ago that he visited the New York Stock Exchange and asked investors to “Buy my Abenomics[1].” He put in a repeat performance on December 30 at the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s final trading session of 2013, exhorting investors to, “Buy my Abenomics next year too[2].” Today Abenomics has become synonymous with Japan’s economy and monetary policy.

In his September 18 article to the Wall Street Journal[3], Abe gave the below points as integral to the second stage of his plan.

  • Reducing the effective corporate tax: A 2.4% reduction this year, further cuts next year, and an effective tax rate target of under 30%.
  • Enhanced corporate governance: Today 74% of companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange have an outside director, up 12% in the past year.
  • New entrants in underdeveloped industrial fields: Encouraging new entrants in fields that have had relatively few—namely the electricity business and healthcare services. The number of firms in the electricity market surged nearly 60% from 38 to 59 in one year.
  • Relaxation of visa requirements: The number of foreigners visiting Japan last year topped 10 million for the first time with a 25% year-on-year increase so far in 2014.
  • Making agriculture a growth sector: Establishing regional "farmland banks" to promote farmland consolidation and large-scale farming. Plans to reform traditional agricultural associations to strengthen the competitiveness of Japan's farmers.
  • Deregulation: Using National Strategic Special Zones to expand areas where regulatory reforms will be implemented to support new businesses, including non-Japanese startups, to create a welcoming environment for talented entrepreneurs, their employees, and home-support workers from overseas. Since mid-July, more than 200 proposals for regulatory reform have been put before the Diet.

Soon after the launch of the second Abe administration, the first and second so-called Abenomics arrows of monetary and fiscal policy left the quiver. The third arrow of growth strategy structural reforms and the fourth arrow—which has garnered great attention both in Japan and overseas—are taking longer to prove effective. The market has high expectations that more action will follow on the heels of these arrows, action including efforts to accelerate deregulation, innovation, and globalization.



In his first press briefing as prime minister in December 2012, Abe told the media that his administration’s mission was to put the economy back on firm footing. He pledged to pull out all fiscal and monetary stops to revive the economy. Indeed, Abe dubbed his C abinet the “crisis-busting Cabinet” and promised to pour his all into three areas: revitalizing the economy, rebuilding from the Great East Japan Earthquake, and crisis management. To get the economy in gear, Abe stressed his so-called three-arrow economic scheme, designed to revive the economy through bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy, and a growth strategy. Two years on, today is an opportune time to take stock of his results.


Table 1: Abenomics: Policy Measures Over Time


Source: Celent analysis


The first arrow brought a new dimension of monetary easing to an economy struggling to shrug off decades of deflation. Nevertheless, today the likelihood of reaching the 2015 core consumer price rise target of 2% remains highly uncertain. Observers expect ongoing monetary easing based on how inflation data plays out, as well as deregulation and innovation policies.

The second arrow of fiscal stimulus can—through two supplementary budgets—be regarded as contributing to bolstering the economy and easing the consumption tax hike impact. Having said that, stimulus measures have relied on conventional public works projects.

As for the third arrow’s growth strategy, the revised Japan Revitalization Strategy addresses corporate tax cuts and regulatory reform in employment, healthcare, and agriculture; yet, it lacks anything appreciably novel in new fields such as energy or in terms of innovation-promoting policies and global strategy.

In a letter to the Financial Times[4] on June 30, 2014, Abe offer the following points in touting his third arrow and growth strategy.

  • On the promises associated with his third arrow: Structural reform has shifted into high gear entailing the following: reducing corporate tax, enhancing corporate governance, requiring companies to appoint outside directors, adopting a Japanese stewardship code, and reform of the Government Pension Investment Fund.
  • Dispelling concerns related to the consumption tax hike: Any negative impact is seen as short-lived. The situation differs from 1997 due to a better employment market, rising wages, and growing imports.
  • Sustaining economic growth amidst an aging and shrinking population: Since starting to promote “womenomics,” we have seen 530,000 women enter the labor market and large companies have pledged to appoint at least one woman executive. Diversity is the operative word and inflexible labor systems will be reviewed and improved to empower women, the young, the elderly, and those with special talents.

The market has regarded these policies with a degree of approval. Market expectations were buoyed by the May 2014 new growth strategy—a revised version of the Japan Revitalization Strategy. Japanese stocks jumped, revisiting the 15,000-yen level. This came following a rebound sell-off by foreign investors disillusioned by the growth strategy (Japan Revitalization Strategy) in the second half of 2013. Investors rang in 2014 with more selling, but the new growth strategy triggered a buy-back. The market has maintained a level of expectations for Abenomics, However, 2015 will be a year of milestones for assessing the success (or lack thereof) of Abenomics. These include the second consumption tax hike, from 8% to 10%, slated for October (although it now appears highly likely this will be postponed), the 2% inflation target and fiscal consolidation.


Figure 1: NIKKEI 225


Source: NIKKEI, JPX, Celent


Figure 2: Foreigners Trading Value of TSE 1st Section Stocks


Source: NIKKEI, JPX, Celent



Japan’s government announced in June 2013 the revitalization strategy to spur growth. The firing of arrows one and two restored corporate and citizen confidence. To transform expectations into reality, three action plans were formulated: the Industry Revitalization Plan, the Strategic Market Creation Plan, and the Strategy of Global Outreach. The global outreach agenda is designed to boost Japan’s share of the pie in international markets.

In June 2014, the revamped version of the revitalization strategy further spelled out 10 policies to address high-priority challenges. To restore Japan’s “earning power,” Abe called for enhanced corporate governance, a review of public funds management, and promotion of venture business as well as an overhaul of corporate tax reform and promotion of innovation. In addition, as an engine to drive this reform and new growth, he called for employment reform to harness the talents of women and foreigners, and renewed efforts to make healthcare as well agriculture, forestry, and fisheries industries that support regional communities. This growth strategy is noteworthy for its emphasis on private business shouldering the growth.


Figure 3: Japan Revitalisation Strategy – Three action plans (June 2013)


Source: "Japan Revitalisation Strategy-Japan is Back-“ http://www.kantei.go.jp


Figure 4: Japan Revitalisation Strategy – Strategy of Global Outreach (June 2013)


Source: "Japan Revitalisation Strategy-Japan is Back-“ http://www.kantei.go.jp


Figure 5: Japan Revitalisation Strategy – Revamped Version (June 2014)


Source: "Revision of Japan Revitalization Strategy”, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/10challenge02shousaiEN.pdf


Market attention and expectations are now focused on Abe’s fourth arrow. Initially Abe’s fourth arrow was fiscal reconstruction accompanied by consumption tax hikes. This is changing as elements such as the hosting of the Tokyo Olympics in 2020 are added to the mix. Still, market players are unified in their opinion that both additional stimulus measures and sustainable structural reform are needed.


Celent is convinced that innovation and globalization are economic growth drivers. Today in the financial arena there are two types of globalization afoot: one is expanding business overseas, the other globalizing the domestic market. The former will entail the public and private sector working together in emerging markets with a focus on Asia to support M&A activities and overseas production in line with the development of the local financial business. The latter will hinge on the globalization of financial markets and the development of both corporate and retail global financial services—both fueled by emerging technologies such as digitalization. Celent hopes that Abenomics fourth arrow is aimed at innovation and globalization and that the arrow flies true.


Figure 6: Three Themes Driving Financial Technology


Source: Celent



[1] Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the New York Stock Exchange, September 25, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/25nyse_e.html

[2] Address at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, December 30, 2013, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/news/131230/fnc13123016480005-n1.htm

[3] The Next Stage of Abenomics Is Coming, WSJ, September 18 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/shinzo-abe-the-next-stage-of-abenomics-is-coming-1411080939

[4] My ‘third arrow’ will fell Japan’s economic demons, FT, June 30, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/p_pd/ip/page4e_000101.html




「ジャパン・パッシング」(日本素通り)から、一夜にして、「Japan Back on to the World’s Radar = 世界の市場の目は日本に注がれる」へ




2014年9月3日、第2次安倍改造内閣が発足した。安倍政権は、2012年12月の発足以来、第二ステージに入った。現政権の掲げる経済政策「アベノミクス」は、様々な評価と批判、そして期待を招いた。首相自身も、2013年9月26日ニューヨーク証券取引所での講演において、「Buy my Abenomics(アベノミクスは『買い』)」[1]と述べ、また、同年12月30日の東京証券取引所大納会でも、「来年もアベノミクスは買い」[2]と発言し、現在、日本の経済・金融政策の代名詞となっている。


  • 法人税の実効税率の引き下げ:今年度4%引き下げ、来年度さらに引き下げる予定。最終的には数年で20%台を目指す。
  • コーポレートガバナンス(企業統治)の強化:東証1部上場企業の74%が社外取締役を任命しており、その割合は過去1年で12%増。
  • 新規参入企業がなかった産業分野の開拓:電力と健康医療サービス分野について、新規参入を促す。電力市場はわずか1年で38社から59社へと6倍成長。
  • ビザ発給要件の緩和:訪日客は昨年初めて1000万人を突破、今年は現在までで既に25%増と、昨年の見事な増加率を上回る。
  • 農業を成長セクターへと転換する施策:農地の集約と大規模化を目的とした都道府県ごとの「農地バンク」の設置。日本の農家の競争力強化に向け、伝統的な農業団体(農協)を改革。
  • 規制緩和への取り組み:「国家戦略特別区域」において、規制改革を実施する地域を拡大、7月半ば以降、200を超える規制改革案を国会へ提出。特区では、有能な起業家やその従業員、外国人ホームヘルパーにとって快適な環境作りを目指し、日本人以外の起業を含む新事業を支援。






表 1: アベノミクス、これまでの政策推移


出典: セレント分析






  • 第3の矢に関する約束への回答:法人税率引下げ、コーポレートガバナンスの強化、社外取締役任命に関する説明規則制定、日本版スチュワードシップ・コードの受入、年金積立金管理運用独立行政法人の改革など、日本の構造改革は、そのギアをハイギアにシフトし推進することを明言。
  • 消費税増税への懸念の払拭:消費の落ち込みは一時的なもの、前回引上げ時の1997年当時との違いを強調、雇用市場の改善、賃金の上昇、輸入の拡大は、増税への懸念を払拭すると、日本経済の回復状況に言及。
  • 高齢化社会と低下する出生率の中での持続可能性:「ウィメノミクス」(女性活用)の旗印の下、53万人の女性が労働市場に参入、大企業は、少なくとも1人の女性を役員として任命するルールなどの成果を強調。キーワードを多様性とし、女性、若者、高齢労働者や特別な能力を有する人々などなど、柔軟性を欠く労働制度の改革を例示。




図  1: 日経平均株価(NIKKEI 225)の推移


出典: NIKKEI, JPX, Celent


図 2: 海外投資家の日本株売買推移


出典: NIKKEI, JPX, Celent






図 3: 日本再興戦略 3つのアクションプラン(2013年6月)


出典: 「日本再興戦略-JAPAN is BACK-」 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/seicho_senryaku2013.html


図 4: 日本再興戦略 国際展開戦略(2013年6月)


出典: 「日本再興戦略-JAPAN is BACK-」 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/seicho_senryaku2013.html


図 5 日本再興戦略 改訂版(2014年6月)


出典: 「日本再興戦略」改訂2014 -未来への挑戦- http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/headline/seicho_senryaku2013.html






図 6: セレントの考える、成長戦略のテクノロジードライバー


出典: セレント


[1] Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the New York Stock Exchange, September 25, 2013, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/25nyse_e.html

[2] 「来年もアベノミクスは買いです」 値上がりに沸く大納会で安倍首相があいさつ、December 30, 2013, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/news/131230/fnc13123016480005-n1.htm

[3] The Next Stage of Abenomics Is Coming, WSJ, September 18 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/shinzo-abe-the-next-stage-of-abenomics-is-coming-1411080939

[4] My ‘third arrow’ will fell Japan’s economic demons, FT, June 30, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/p_pd/ip/page4e_000101.html