About Arin Ray

Arin Ray is an analyst with Celent's Securities & Investments practice and is based in the firm's New York office. Arin's expertise lies in capital markets where he has extensive research experience in exchange trading, clearing and settlement, brokerages, and use of technology in capital markets. In his recent consulting work, he has advised a large European financial services provider to devise their post trade (settlement) strategy, a tier 1 Japanese brokerage in their product and technology strategy, and a leading international exchange in their market entry and growth strategy in Asian markets. He has published research reports on exchange and over the counter trading, exchange strategies, and adoption of trading technology in different sub-segments of capital markets.

Arin has been quoted regularly in the media, including Reuters, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Dow Jones, Press Trust of India, Economic Times, Financial Express, Finance Asia, Global Investor Magazine, BusinessWeek, Business Standard, Asian Investor, Pension & Investment, Business Week, and Securities Industry News. In addition, he regularly contributes bylined articles for the financial media; his articles have appeared in The Journal of Trading, Advanced Trading, Free Press Journal, FT Asian Investment, gtnews, and Ignites Asia among others.

Arin received his MBA from the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore and B.E. in Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering from Jadavpur University. He is fluent in English, Hindi and Bengali.

Interoperability: Potential Game Changer for Indian CCPs

India has many stock exchanges, but trading is dominated at two main exchanges – the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). BSE is among the oldest stock exchanges in the world, while NSE was established as part of India’s economic liberalization process in the early 1990s. The NSE was quick to gain market share and now accounts for around two-third of stock trading and most of derivative trading in the country. BSE was slow to react to competition in the early days, but in the last five to six years has taken steps to up its game by making major changes in its technology. Structural issues with the Indian capital market have so far limited its ability to close the gap with NSE. The Indian CCPs that clear exchange trades are owned by the respective exchanges and at present only clear trades executed at the owner exchange. National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited (NSCCL) is the CCP for NSE while Indian Clearing Corporation Limited (ICCL) is the CCP for BSE. Interoperability among CCPs at an investor level is not allowed; i.e., investors can choose which exchange would execute their trades, but cannot choose which CCP would clear them. Therefore, in spite of having multiple players in the clearing space, there is not much competition among the CCPs. The dynamics in the Indian CCP space therefore are largely driven by the competitive developments on the exchange front. The capital market regulator SEBI allowed direct market access in India in 2008 and soon afterwards allowed colocation and smart order routing (SOR). This should ideally allow investors to execute their trades at any exchange of their choice. However, most of the liquidity is concentrated at the NSE due to its dominant position. Furthermore, since almost all of derivative trading takes place at the NSE, investors tend to prefer NSE for their equity trades as well, since that allows them cross-asset margining benefits of clearing trades in different asset classes at the same CCP. Because of this, smart order routing has not picked up in India yet. Thus algo trading reached around 15% in the cash segment in NSE in 2014, but smart order routing was only around 2%. Similarly algo trading was 70% at BSE’s cash segment, but SOR was around 1%. This shows BSE (and its CCP ICCL), with its improved technology and latency capabilities, is attracting a higher share of algo trades but is still unable to capture share in smart order routing, due to unique clearing arrangements in the market. Going forward potential allowing of interoperability promises to be a significant force of change for the Indian CCPs. It would give investors the freedom to choose their CCP, and if they get better latency and pricing from ICCL, they could choose ICCL regardless of BSE’s smaller share in trading volume. SEBI is considering this and is in consultation with a range of market participants. Eventual interoperability may be a boon for BSE and ICCL, allowing it to catch up with the dominant NSE and NSCCL.

HKEX’s China based Strategy: Fruitful Past, Uncertain Future

A key reason behind Hong Kong’s high rank in terms of capital market development, in spite of being the 37th largest economy in the world, is its vicinity to China. Hong Kong acts as a conduit between Chinese companies and international investors, helping Chinese companies access capital from the outside world as well as providing Chinese investors access to investment opportunities in the Asian region; around half of companies listed on the HKEx are from China. Consequently, since the mid-1990s, Hong Kong’s capital market growth has largely been driven by growth of the mainland economy. Hong Kong’s exchange operator, the HKEx group, has built its core business around the China growth story and came out relatively unscathed from the crisis of 2008. A dominant theme in the group’s recent strategy has been to move even closer to the mainland market by connecting to the mainland’s stock exchanges and providing members of two exchanges mutual access. In November, 2014, HKEx launched the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program, enabling Chinese investors to trade shares listed and traded in Hong Kong and vice versa; Shenzhen HK connect is planned in the near future. In the last three years China has been opening up the Renminbi (RMB), and Hong Kong is positioning itself as China’s offshore RMB center by building RMB capability and developing diversified RMB products. HKEx is looking to capitalize on this opportunity as well. The mainland’s high demand for raw materials and international trades in commodities is another driver for the HKEx group. It recently acquired the London Metal Exchange (LME) Group to signal its intent to grow a commodity business. Leveraging on this acquisition it plans to build an “East Wing” of commodities clearing for the whole Asian region and during Asian time zone. HKEx’s future prospects, like its historic growth, are contingent on the mainland dynamics. While it has many upsides, too much reliance on China can have downside risks in case of slowing down of the Chinese economy or emergence of policy hurdles. Recent slowdown of Chinese economy has raised concerns about the prospects for its future growth and its potential adverse impact on the China-Hong Kong trading link. On the commodities front China seems uninterested at this point in taking help from other markets. Furthermore, commodities trading practices differ between China and Hong Kong as investors in China, unlike those in Hong Kong, want physical delivery. This requires significant warehouses that the HKEx is still in the process of developing. Lastly, neighboring Singapore will present competition in the OTC space as it also plans to be a major player in the region focusing on South East Asia and China.

The Market structure debate in Asian context

The recent debate about the impact of High Frequency Trading (HFT) and on the issue of market structure in general is no more confined within the US market. Regulators and market participants worldwide are discussing this issue seriously. The chairman of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) recently detailed the position of the Australian authorities in this regard. Incidentally Australia, along with Japan, is one of the few Asian countries that have multiple trading venues, a necessary condition for the growth of advanced trading and order routing capabilities, including HFT. It is worthwhile to look at the state of adoption of the Asian region in terms of adoption of advanced trading tools, and the role of the Asian exchanges in that regard. The different Asian markets are at different levels of maturity, and therefore it is difficult to analyse the region as a single homogenous entity; rather the Asian markets can be grouped into two broad categories. The first category belongs to the advanced economies like Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore which have well developed capital markets. Exchanges in these countries are at par with western competitors in terms of latency and adoption of advanced trading technologies. The second category consists of exchanges in emerging economies like India, China, Malaysia, Korea which are somewhat lagging their Asian counterparts in the first category. However, there is a common factor that runs across the two categories of exchanges – lack of competition from alternative trading venues. This means that most of the Asian exchanges are largely national monopolies without significant competition from alternative providers, though the situation is slowly changing in some markets (e.g., Australia, Japan). This is one aspect which distinguishes Asia from the western markets where the competition among exchanges and alternative trading venues is severe. Another key challenge in Asia is the fragmentation of markets and lack of harmonization – regulatory, economic, monetary and technological – in trading and settlement practices. This restricts the growth of cross border trading volumes and greater regional integration at an Asian level. The ASEAN initiative is a move in that direction, but it is still early days to judge its potential for achieving regional integration. Asia has also lagged the western markets in terms of adoption of advanced trading tools and technologies (like DMA, algorithmic trading, high frequency trading etc). Some of the Asian exchanges, particularly the ones in the advanced economies, have adopted latest technologies with low latency and colocation offerings, but some of the above mentioned factors still present challenges. For example, lack of multiple trading venues limits arbitrage opportunities. Lack of regional integration means cross border flows have yet to realize its full potential. These prevent growth of trading volumes, need for advanced trading tools and technologies, and participation of foreign players in domestic markets. Regulators in Asia are traditionally very conservative. Therefore decision making for significant changes in market structure and practices takes time. In a rapidly evolving trading world, this means Asian exchanges find hard to stay abreast with global trends. Also because domestic exchanges are perceived more as national utilities, any proposal that threatens the position of incumbent exchanges is met with resistance and difficult to implement. Some of the Asian exchanges have been very aggressive in exploring newer avenues beyond the traditional revenue sources. The Singapore exchange is a good example of that. It started offering clearing services for commodity derivatives through its AsiaClear offering a few years ago. In addition to providing CCP services as mandated for OTC derivatives under the proposed reforms, the SGX is collaborating with the Korea Exchange to develop the latters’ OTC clearing capabilities. Therefore in some markets (like Singapore) the incumbent exchanges are taking a leading role in clearing of OTC derivatives as proposed by new regulations. It will be interesting to see if new players will be able to enter and succeed in this business. Low volumes in the Asian markets, proliferation of CCPs, and competition from international ones may result in each CCP specializing in specific niches along product lines or local currency instruments.

Challenges with China’s RMB Internationalization Process

Chinese authorities have been making concerted efforts of late to internationalize its currency (renminbi, RMB) by trying to increase its use in international trade settlement and investment. Their efforts are paying off as international RMB payments and trade settlement have grown rapidly since 2010. The whole process consists of three broad steps beginning with the use of RMB in trade settlement, then investment and then as a global reserve currency. The first step is well underway and has received the most traction of the three – around 10-15% of China’s international trade is settled in RMB at present. China has currency swap agreements with 24 central banks allowing them to directly settle international RMB trade. Use of RMB for investment purposes is still limited due to lack of development of the Chinese capital markets and strict controls imposed by the Chinese authorities. Use of RMB as a global reserve currency is the most ambitious step and likely to take the longest time. At present several central banks have expressed interest for increasing RMB holding as part of their reserve. However, the quantum of holding is small at present and primarily geared towards diversification of foreign assets.

In spite of these developments, there are challenges with China’s efforts to internationalize the RMB. Even though the Chinese currency recently broke into the list of top ten currencies globally, its share is still miniscule (~1%) in total global payments. At a broad level, RMB is mostly used to settle imports, but not exports – roughly a third of imports and less than 5% of exports are settled in RMB at present. Even in imports, invoicing is often done in US dollars while settlement happens in RMB.

A necessary requirement for RMB internationalization is to first make it fully convertible. China is planning to do this first through the offshore markets. Doing the same in the onshore market by opening capital account and liberalizing interest rate regime will be more challenging.

Then there are operational challenges for banks that need to be addressed. New systems and processes will be required to support clearing and settlement of payments in real time by domestic and international players. They also need to support different languages including Chinese, English and other regional ones and to accommodate working hours in different time zones to bring about a truly international system of operations.

These will also require strengthening of China’s anti-money laundering (AML) framework. AML practices in China have been in development for over 15 years, however, the AML regulations were largely inadequate until as late as 2006-07. As a result the internal control systems and company culture at banks in China tend to be inadequate, and they do not go beyond meeting basic regulatory requirements at present.

Given the rapid developments in the RMB internationalization process over the last three years, there has been a lot of enthusiasm and optimism expressed by several players regarding its potential to bring in major changes in the immediate future. However, it is safe to assume from past experiences that China will follow a planned, controlled, and slow but steady path in trying to raise the importance of its currency at a global level. True internationalization of RMB will require fundamental changes on many fronts including regulatory, market infrastructure, political and geopolitical aspects. An intermediate step in realizing the ultimate goal may be to first make RMB a dominant currency at a regional level (ASEAN/Asian). The extent of its adoption at a global level will however be long drawn and closely watched.

Issues with Fund performance in India

The Indian mutual fund industry has a very high number of schemes which has been another cause for concern for regulators. In 2012-13 there were a total of 1,294 schemes, while there were only 403 of them in 2004. A high number of schemes make the job of choosing a suitable scheme for retail investors difficult.  However, offering new schemes has been a marketing tool for many AMCs, and an easier route for garnering more assets. If some of them start launching new schemes frequently, others are forced to follow as they fear otherwise they would be perceived as inactive or not aggressive by investors. The regulator has been asking fund houses to rationalize so many offerings, and offer limited number of them which are truly different from each other. Some success was achieved in this regard in 2008 and 2009 when number of new schemes launched went down significantly. However, that trend was short lived and high numbers of new schemes are again being launched since then. Too many schemes make choosing suitable scheme difficult. It is also interesting to analyze how different funds have performed over the years. One way of doing this is to compare the return given by a particular fund with respect to a benchmark index. If the fund beat the benchmark on a consistent basis, say for 1/3/5 year period, it can be said to have outperformed. The argument of active management of funds and charging of fees for that purpose is justified in such cases. If, on the other hand, a fund fails to beat the benchmark index, then an investor is better served by investing in an index fund (which has lower fees being a passively managed fund) tracking the benchmark index. Since December 2009, S&P and CRISIL periodically publish a scorecard, titled “S&P CRISIL SPIVA”, comparing the performance of Indian mutual funds with appropriate benchmark indices during various time periods. Here we aggregate findings from four such reports published in December (H2) 2009, June (H1) 2011, December (H2) 2011 and June (H1) 2012, and plotted in the figure (each column in the figure indicates the proportion of funds that have failed to beat corresponding benchmark). We have selected two types of equity funds (large cap and diversified) and debt funds. We have also added a 50% (red) line for easier interpretation of what proportion of funds have outperformed; 50% being associated with the probability of two outcomes for a fair coin toss. The following observations can be made:
  • A large proportion of firms has failed to outperform the corresponding benchmark for each year and for each time period considered.
  • Debt funds have done relatively better; they have outperformed the benchmark indices more times compared to other two types of funds on a consistent basis. Except for one case (1 year, H1 2009) they are well below the 50% line.
  • The two types of equity funds on the other hand have performed poorly over time.
  • In a large majority of cases (18 out of 24) over 50% of them have failed to outperform the corresponding benchmark. Large caps have performed worse (11 out of 12 cases above the 50% line) compared to diversified funds (7 out of 12 cases). This implies if an investor was to choose a fund from each of these two categories, a toss of a fair coin on average would yield better result than seeking advice from a fund manager.
mf_performance Amidst several debates and discussion on entry load and distributor incentives, the issue of underperformance of mutual funds is often lost. However, this is one concern that should receive the most attention from all stakeholders. Unless mutual funds start offering better returns and outperforming benchmark indices on a regular basis, it will be difficult to attract investors to this industry regardless of number of schemes, geographic reach or entry load.

Use of OTC Derivatives by Asian Corporates

Asia accounts for less than 10% of notional outstanding of the global OTC derivative market. Even within Asia, trading activity is primarily dominated by the four advanced countries Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. Most of the OTC products in Asia are plain vanilla in nature, and as a result the OTC markets emerging Asian countries are at a very early stage of development. Corporates in Asia primarily use OTC derivatives to satisfy their need for customization. Foreign Exchange (FX) derivatives are the most popular OTC instruments used by Asian corporates. Many corporates have regional or international operations; they use cross currency swaps as net investment hedges for foreign currency exchange risk of international operations. In addition, corporates engaged in significant imports and exports use forward foreign exchange contracts as cash flow hedges for exposure to foreign currency exchange risks arising from forecasted or committed expenditure. Interest rate instruments are also popular among Asian corporates. Many Asian corporates have issued foreign currency denominated debt and therefore use cross currency interest rate swaps to hedge interest rate risk and cash flow hedges to hedge currency risk arising from issued bonds. In addition, corporates also engage in OTC commodity derivatives.  Commodity derivatives, particularly those involving palm oil and rubber, are in demand from Southeast Asian corporates. Moreover, corporates in the energy and manufacturing sectors use them to hedge against price fluctuations in the underlying commodities. Emerging Asian countries lack necessary infrastructure for onshore OTC commodity derivatives trading. Corporates in those countries therefore have to deal with international exchanges or with international counterparties.  Asian corporates typically engage in OTC derivatives for hedging, and not for trading purposes. Therefore many of them have not set up infrastructure for exchange trading. Small percentage of them is using centrally cleared derivatives at present. However, this is likely to change in the future since regulators are now encouraging and incentivizing central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives as part of the OTC derivative market reform process. While reducing counterparty risk is an obvious benefit of using central clearing, CCP also reduces clearing costs, as without central clearing one has to pay higher margins up front. With requirements of central clearing and other associated reforms, it is argued that the use of OTC derivatives may decline. If that happens, it will be mostly limited to financial institutions’ use of these instruments who engage in them for trading purposes; the need for OTC derivatives for hedging purpose is likely to increase. Non-financial corporates accounted for around 20% of OTC derivative trading in the emerging Asian economies, while they accounted for only 6% in the four advanced countries. This indicates the involvement of real economic actors and trade related activities are higher in the emerging country OTC markets. This is also due to the fact that in advanced countries large dealers and other financial institutions engage in significant trading and market making activities in the OTC space. Corporates’ high share in emerging country OTC market is likely to continue or even increase as the real economic output of the countries grows.  This will be driven by economic growth, growing international operations and trading activity of local firms, liberalization of financial markets and regulatory initiatives facilitating more cross border trading. The developments in the emerging economies will also contribute to the growth of OTC activity in the advanced countries, particularly in Hong Kong and Singapore, as a significant proportion of activity in those markets comes from investors in the neighbouring countries who cannot meet their demand in local markets. However, this process is likely to evolve slowly as regulators in the region are traditionally conservative in nature.

Entry Load Ban and its Impact in India

India’s mutual fund sector has traditionally been dominated by investments from the institutional investors, namely banks and financial institutions, non-financial corporates and foreign institutional investors. However, mutual funds are primarily vehicles for retail investments. Retail investments accounted for 51% of India’s mutual fund industry AuM in 2012-13 growing from 43% in 2008-09. While the growth in share may be due to a temporary decline in institutions’ share, retail investments has grown continuously in recent years. More importantly average holding period has gone up in recent years. The practice of charging mandatory entry load was abolished by SEBI to reduce churning, since distributors would encourage investors to prematurely terminate their investments and make new investments as that gave them more commission. Since equity funds earned the highest commission, we analyze the changes in average holding period for equity investments from retail investors. It can be seen that proportion of investments held for over 2 years has gone up, for both retail investors and HNIs. This has come largely at the cost of investments held for between 1 and 2 years. The share of investments held for less than one year has remained more or less same during this time. This is perhaps due to the fact that distributors would typically not ask investors to churn their investments within a year of investment, but afterwards. This trend therefore suggests that the abolition of entry load has indeed resulted in investors holding on to investments for longer duration, and thereby engaging less in churning. holding period We discuss this and other key issues pertaining to the Indian Mutual Fund Industry in a new report.

Evolving Business Models in India’s Mutual Fund Industry

The Indian mutual fund industry has been going through turmoil in the last few years due to uncertain market conditions and regulatory changes. Many firms, predominantly foreign ones, have exited the industry since 2008. Existing asset management companies (AMCs) are exploring a number of different models to counter the challenges and stay competitive in the evolving regulatory and competitive environment. The dominant theme that is emerging in the industry is that of formation of partnerships and alliances. This can be gauged from the rising share of private sector joint venture companies that are predominantly Indian in recent times, as discussed earlier. The fusion of global best practices from international partner and local know-how of domestic players is creating good synergy. Some recent examples include partnerships between T Row Price and UTI, Schroders Plc and Axis Bank, Nomura and LIC mutual fund. Realizing the importance of scale in this industry, some firms are taking the inorganic route to grow quickly through acquisition. Along with growth of AuM in a short time, firms try to achieve other strategic objectives as well through this approach. Thus L&T’s acquisition of Fidelity’s business not only increases its asset share, it also increases composition of equity funds in its portfolio, and thereby raising the potential for fee-based revenues. Similarly Goldman Sachs acquisition of Benchmark, the earliest and leading provider of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in India, allowed the firms to gain foothold into the fast growing ETF segment. Some bank sponsored mutual funds are trying to focus on distribution through parent bank branches. Though they are not opposed to third party distributors selling their products, they are not actively exploring that channel. Some international asset managers have exhibited interest to tie up with such banks to garner market share in this way. Partnership between Union Bank and KBC Asset Management is one such example. While typically 50-60% of equity funds are sold through parent branch network in case of bank sponsored mutual funds, the aim of such initiative is to sell 80-90% of the funds through parent bank’s network. However, the foreign partner needs to be careful regarding its choice of bank partners, as we have seen having large branch network does not guarantee easier access to more assets. Mutual fund business clearly has to be a strategic focus for the partner bank. Bankers in general are not very aggressive about mutual fund business, as most of their time and resources are spent on helping banking clients with normal banking services. Margins from banking services are higher than mutual funds in many cases, and therefore sales of mutual funds are often not given adequate focus. Instead of forming strategic alliances, in some cases fund houses have tie ups with banks just to distribute their products. For example, Birla Sun Life, HDFC, IDBI have such agreement with Syndicate Bank. However, this approach has achieved limited success so far. Moreover, if the bank itself is a sponsor of mutual funds, there is clearly conflict of interest, which fund managers need to keep in mind. Observing the increasing shift from transaction based to advice based model of the fund business, some firms have initiated or strengthened their portfolio management services. This is primarily targeted towards the higher end of the mass affluent segment and the HNI segment, as they are usually big ticket investors, have needs to manage a broad portfolio, and are more likely to pay fee for advice. It should be mentioned that India does not have a well-defined wealth management industry, and this initiative has a lot of overlap with the provision of wealth management services. HNI segment traditionally has turned to the international banks in the country for wealth management services which helped them with offshore investment opportunities and international best practices. However, the domestic asset managers are increasingly moving up the value chain and making inroads in the wealth management space. It needs to be said even though a number of AMCs has started offering this service, only a few of them (e.g., Kotak, ICICI) have been successful. Some Indian AMCs are now taking the next step of garnering investments from international investors by opening offices in international locations like New York, London, Singapore, Japan and the Gulf countries. Earlier they would pay high commission to foreign distributors in local markets to sell their products; now they are trying to be in charge of distribution themselves by opening offices in those locations. This way they save on paying commission, and also benefit from high margin of managing international investors’ money. While the ambition is to cater to the entire gamut of international investors, NRIs are more likely to provide early in-roads for success. Here again, some firms are looking at prospects of strategic partnership with foreign fund houses to gain quicker traction in foreign markets. Examples include UTI’s plans of launching offshore Shariah funds in the Gulf region. Some of the other leading AMCs are also planning to go international. Improving operational efficiency is an area that has not received much attention, but can be a cost saver. Indian financial firms have traditionally lagged in the adoption of technology and processes that increase efficiency of operations. However, this situation has somewhat improved in recent times with the banks and brokerages increasing their use of technology. For banks the driver has been regulations, while competition from foreign brokerages has forced domestic brokerages to adopt latest technology. Unfortunately there is no such driver for the AMCs. Firms need to give this aspect more consideration than they have given in the past.

Back Office Outsourcing by Buy Side Firms

In the last few years buy side firms have had to make lot of changes in their mid and back offices. There are primarily two drivers that have forced firms to make these changes. Leading up to 2007, the economic climate was favorable, and profits were rising, which meant technology budgets were also on the rise. Many firms made technology investments on an ad-hoc, or as per need, basis. Since the front office trading departments are primary revenue generators in trading firms, the technology decisions were largely determined by front office staff based on their immediate needs for certain asset class or execution methods. The mid and back office activities were largely ignored and continued to be run by legacy systems. The crisis of 2008 changed firms’ priorities dramatically. Revenues dwindled and margins were hit. In tumultuous economic climate managing costs became an utmost priority. While downsizing enabled cost cutting in the short run, firms had to consider long term cost savings opportunities by improving operational efficiency and making strategic technology decisions. Against this backdrop the mid-back office was ripe for attention. Many institutions still use legacy systems. Most of them are based on simple excels, offline communication, and handled manually without much automation. There is little integration in the mid-back office of the disparate platforms used in the front office. These create huge operational inefficiencies, and if not addressed adequately, can diminish or even nullify the efficiency gains achieved in the execution of trades. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the regulatory environment has undergone rapid changes and is still evolving. This has created additional obligations for mid-back office processes in the areas of risk management, reporting and regulatory compliance. It has become essential that firms address the complete trade cycle in a much more holistic way, and are on top of their processes almost on a real time basis to be able to adequately address regulatory and business needs. These two drivers are often conflicting with each other. In the short term, firms have to prioritize technology investments to address regulatory and compliance related issues. Large numbers of impending regulations and a finite technology budget have meant most of the spending is being made to meet regulatory issues, which leaves little room to invest in projects on efficiency and process improvement. Some firms have mentioned to us as much as 60% to 80% of their change management budget is being spent on regulatory and compliance related issues. In this backdrop, outsourcing of mid-back office processes by buy-side institutions is becoming popular. Since almost all of them have to make same, or similar, arrangements to adhere to regulators’ demands, there is good potential for the development of shared utility services whereby firms can outsource some or all of their back office functions to a third party service provider. While the trend of outsourcing in back office function is not new to the industry, this practice is gaining greater traction as buy-side firms realize the complexities of reconciling higher volumes of more complex trades – this is increasing the strain on staff and IT. At the same time, service providers have improved their capabilities and now offer a wide variety of choice for their buy-side clients. Custodian banks are seeing a surge of interest in their outsourcing services from buy-side firms. Increasingly custodians are finding that clients are asking for solutions specifically to deal with the new derivatives regulations. The concentration of flow driven by outsourcing is likely to accelerate within derivatives operations. However, we expect the trend will eventually affect cash securities operations as buy-side look to rationalize their back office functions. Through outsourcing services, investment manager will move fixed cost into variable ones and decrease the complexity of their back office operations. This evolution will be particularly acute in derivatives operations due to the complexity of dealing with the new regulatory regime, DFA and EMIR. Prime brokers will be able to leverage their back office capabilities to insource additional flow, especially around derivatives operations. While there are similarities in the mid-back office functions and processes at global institutions, large banks also need significant customization to manage firm specific needs. The challenge in developing a utility based service model is to design a common platform that will still have room for addressing custom needs. Many providers are considering of coming up with such an offering. There is a race to accomplish this at the earliest as they understand that the first one to offer it would have a big advantage over others.

The State of the Indian Capital Market

There are fundamental problems in the Indian capital market structure, such as lack of liquidity and limited depth and breadth. Many listed securities on stock exchanges are not traded; among the traded securities, not many are traded actively. The market is highly concentrated; a few companies dominate trading at the exchanges. This clearly narrows the breadth of the market, giving rise to liquidity problems for many stocks. Geographic breadth is another problem for Indian markets. Around 80% to 90% of total cash trading and 70% to 80% of mutual fund ownership come from the top 10 cities, with the top two cities (Mumbai and Delhi) accounting for about 60% in each segment.. These shortcomings can be addressed by technology development, better regulations, and focus on financial inclusion. India’s capital market regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), has been addressing many of these issues. Although the equity market in India is relatively well developed, the debt market is lagging by some distance. The debt market is dominated by government securities. The corporate bond market is very small for a number of reasons, including lack of market infrastructure and adequate regulatory framework, low liquidity, lack of investor interest, etc. Efforts are being made to develop the corporate bond market. Some of the measures include increasing the limit for foreign participation, reducing issuance and transaction costs for corporate bonds, applying similar mark to market accounting requirements for loan and corporate bonds to discourage banks from relying heavily on loans, and setting up a basic framework of credit default swaps on corporate bonds in the country. Some positive results have been observed in recent years, but debt market development will require long-term efforts and commitment. By contrast, India has a healthy exchange-traded derivatives market. India started off with trading in derivatives in the early 2000s, initially allowing trading in index futures (2000) and index options (2001). Options and futures on stocks were allowed in 2001. Since then the product universe has expanded, as has the investor base, resulting in higher volumes and a robust trading platform with sound risk management practices. Index futures and options and stocks futures dominate derivative contracts traded at Indian exchanges. The investor segment is broadly classified into retail and institutional segments. The retail segment brings in the volume, but its trades are essentially low value. A key concern has been this segment’s drop in participation in the secondary market and also in IPOs. This decline began with the crisis in 2008, but the lackluster performance of most IPOs has contributed to what has become an alarming drop. Foreign institutional investors (FIIs) have been a dominant contributor to Indian markets. Since economic reforms started in 1991, India has focused on attracting foreign investment flows by relaxing eligibility conditions for FIIs, relaxing investment limits, and expanding investment instruments. The intermediaries in the market include the exchanges and brokerages. India has 22 stock exchanges registered with SEBI, with over 8,000 registered brokers and over 60,000 registered subbrokers. However, most of the trading takes place at the two major pan-Indian exchanges, National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). NSE is the largest exchange in the country, with around 70% of the equity volumes, while BSE is the second largest. A lot of revamp is happening within exchanges as they turn more competitive to gain market share. Brokers, both domestic and international, are competing in a highly fragmented market. The next wave of growth will probably arise out of technological capabilities, and hence brokerages are trying to outdo each other by providing advanced trading tools like Direct Market Access (DMA) support and algorithmic trading solutions. India has been an early adopter of the various technological changes occurring in the capital markets. With electronic trading picking up along with the adoption of the internet, booming retail equity business evolved in the last 10 years. Surprisingly, due to the market boom and IPO bonanza, retail adoption of technology initially outgrew technology adoption on the institutional side, where voice brokers still played a large part. As foreign participation in the Indian markets picked up, it brought in a rigor and technological requirement essential for international competition leading to adoption of the latest technologies by domestic market participants. A key reason for the success of the Indian capital markets has been the efficiency of SEBI, the capital market regulator. Four regulators control the participants in the securities market. There have been turf wars, and the future might see a super-regulator. India has a good regulatory environment regulating the capital markets, which shielded the economy, to some extent, from larger negative impacts of the global financial crisis and helped it regain its mark quickly afterwards. The regulator has been cautious in expanding the market, and transparency and investor protection have always been high on its agenda. This has sometimes created conflicts with industries as well as among regulators, but it has taken the markets along the right path of development.